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In international financial circles, bank accounts have long sup-
planted "chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of the Swiss econ-
omy."1 Influenced by Switzerland's reputation for prudence and discre-
tion in banking matters, overseas investors have reportedly placed more
than $140 billion in assets in Swiss banks.' In 1986, the three largest
commercial banks in Switzerland each announced that their net profits
increased twelve percent, and two other leading Swiss banks reported
even greater increases.' Switzerland's collective success in attracting
foreign capital and generating profits may prove a cynosure for many
United States commercial banks.
Conventional analysis of the Swiss banking system has attributed
Switzerland's emergence as an international financial center to such
factors as its political stability and neutrality, its geographic location, its
multilingualism, the health of its currency and public finances, the ini-
tiative and enterprising spirit of its businesses, and the confidence of
other nations in its banks." Without discounting any of these factors,
Benedicte Vibe Christensen of the International Monetary Fund staff
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; Trial Attorney, Fraud Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice, 1988- ; Director, Office of Financial
Enforcement, United States Department of the Treasury, 1986-1988. J.D., University
of Virginia, 1980; M.A., University of Virginia, 1978; A.B., Princeton University,
1974. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Treasury Department or of any official thereof.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).
Evans, Forcing Discreet Money Into the Open, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1986, at 170.
Another author has estimated that total foreign deposits in Swiss banks have reached $1
trillion. Manoff, The Currency of Solvency, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1986, at 56.
3 Bank Results, THE BANKER, Apr. 1987, at 15.
4 M. IKLE, SWITZERLAND: AN INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE
CENTER 155 (E. Schiff trans. 1972).
(251)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
has sought, in a recent study,5 to identify other factors that conventional
analysis has overlooked or ignored.
One of these additional factors is the existence of a universal bank-
ing system in Switzerland.6 Incorporated into Swiss law in 1934 - a
time when other nations were imposing restrictions on banking activity
in response to the worldwide banking crisis - the principle of univer-
sality has not only suited the needs of banks in a country emphatically
devoted to federalism, but, in Christensen's words, "has given its banks
a competitive advantage over countries in which specialized banking
has prevailed."'7 Switzerland's universal banking system may attract in-
creasing scrutiny from United States bankers as more serious considera-
tion is given to various proposals for restructuring the United States
banking system.'
Another factor that Christensen believes has "undoubtedly also
played a crucial role" 9 is the maintenance of bank secrecy. Bank se-
crecy in Switzerland is derived from a private-law right to individual
privacy, supported by principles of contract and agency law, and made
enforceable through criminal sanctions."' While the laws of other coun-
tries also offer bank secrecy to foreign investors, Swiss law makes a
breach of bank secrecy punishable by imprisonment for not more than
six months and a fine of not more than SFr 50,000.1 Moreover, banks
in Switzerland are obliged to provide information on customers' ac-
counts to governmental authorities only when certain acts proscribed by
Swiss law are being investigated. This limitation on disclosure has
been particularly troublesome for United States prosecutions of large
I B. CHRISTENSEN, SWITZERLAND'S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CENrER (1986). Christensen is with the European Department of the International
Monetary Fund.
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scale tax evaders who have used Swiss financial accounts to conceal the
profits of their crimes.
Christensen's study is especially useful in identifying the types of
international capital transactions in which Swiss banks apparently have
secured a competitive advantage. While Switzerland has not had a fully
developed domestic money market, Swiss banks have traditionally had
considerable success in medium and long-term operations such as pub-
lic bond and note issues, and have lately found fiduciary accounts to be
an increasingly important element among short-term transactions.13
Christensen's discussion of these transactions, and of the dynamics of
the Swiss capital market, 4 is both concrete and highly informative.
Christensen's review of recent developments in international finan-
cial markets is less satisfactory, principally where it examines Switzer-
land's competitiveness as an international financial center. Rejecting the
view that "there is no such thing as competition between financial cen-
ters," 5 he observes not only that Switzerland competes with other fi-
nancial centers, but also that its competitiveness has been adversely af-
fected by several recent developments. One such development is
deregulation in other major financial centers, which "has shifted part of
international business to domestic markets, reducing Switzerland's
traditional comparative advantage of having a universal banking sys-
tem."'" Another development is a series of separate decisions by the
United States, France, and West Germany to repeal their respective
withholding taxes on interest income from securities owned by nonresi-
dents.' Because a number of Swiss financial institutions have shifted to
providing more services to institutional investors, which usually have a
relatively high turnover in their portfolios, Switzerland's maintenance
of its withholding tax on interest income and its stamp duty on all se-
curities transactions has reportedly affected its attractiveness to inves-
tors in several respects.' Christensen notes that the stamp duty has
helped to prevent a development of a Swiss money market, prevented
Swiss banks from participating actively in Eurobond trading in Swit-
zerland, and adversely affected securities transactions by dealers in
Switzerland.' 9
Is Id. at 12-13.
1, Id. at 13-17.
1 M. IKLE, supra note 4, at 2.
1 B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 27.
17 Id. at 27, 29.
i8 Id. at 31. A subsequent article estimated that approximately 70% of the funds
invested in Switzerland are managed for private individuals rather than institutions.
French, Fog Lifts On Swiss Money Mountains, EuROMONEY, Mar. 1987, at 101.
19 B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 32.
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Since the publication of Christensen's study, the Swiss Parliament
has voted to abolish the stamp duty on share transactions, even though
the duty was expected to contribute approximately $820 million to the
Swiss federal budget in 1986.20 In addition, the Swiss Minister of Fi-
nance announced in 1986 the abolition of a 6.2% turnover tax on physi-
cal gold transactions, the elimination of a 35% withholding tax on in-
terbank deposits of less than one year, and a 50% reduction in the
turnover duty on Eurobond purchases in the primary market.21
Christensen's analysis of Switzerland's competitiveness, however,
is incomplete in three respects. First, he clearly states that the study "is
mainly confined to the financial markets located in Switzerland,"22 but
does not discuss the significance of increasing competition by foreign
banks in the Swiss capital market. The number of main offices of for-
eign financial institutions in Switzerland has increased from 19 in
196823 to 226 in 1986.24 Competition from the United States and other
foreign nations has made substantial inroads into the market shares
previously enjoyed by the large Swiss banks.25
Second, Christensen's decision to focus primarily on Swiss finan-
cial markets, and to touch "only fragmentarily on the activities of
Swiss-owned banks abroad, '26 precludes consideration of the increased
activity by Swiss banks in acquiring or competing directly with finan-
cial institutions outside Switzerland.2" In the United States and Europe,
for example, Swiss firms have been acquiring substantial ownership in-
terests in leading banks and investment houses,28 and United States
subsidiaries of Swiss banks led or co-managed a number of significant
domestic debt issues in 1986.29 Similarly, in 1985 and 1986, one West
German subsidiary of a Swiss bank lead-managed at least twelve issues
in the Deutschemark foreign bond market and launched several inter-
20 Parry, Swiss Ease Rules on Share Transactions To Help Banks Keep Place in
the Sun, Am. Banker, Dec. 30, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
" Evans, Stich in Time Is Not Enough, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1986, at 14.
22 B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 1.
2 M. IRLE, supra note 4, at 60-61.
24 Foreign Banks and Securities Houses in Switzerland, EuROMONEY, Ded.
1986, at 111. This listing includes banks registered under Swiss law that are more than
50% foreign-owned. Id.
25 Lee, See What The Boys In The Back Street Will Do, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1986,
at 101.
28 B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 1.
2 See Parry, 'Banked Out,' Swiss Seek Profits Abroad, Am. Banker, Sept. 10,
1987, at 2, col. 1.
28 See Lee, On the Brink of Reconstruction, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1988, at 57, 60;
Sterngold, Japanese Buying a Place on Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1987, at
E26, col. 1.
29 Fanning, Set Us Free, FORBES, Feb. 23, 1987, at 94; see Allied With UBS in
Bonds, EUROMONEY, July 1986, at 8.
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national equity issues for West German companies." If actions such as
these are responses by Swiss banks to the deregulation and liberaliza-
tion of foreign markets - a factor that, according to Christensen, has
reduced the Swiss advantage of universal banking 1 - the study should
have mentioned them, if not examined them in some detail.
Third, Christensen merely summarizes Swiss bank secrecy law
and a few recent revisions in that law without analyzing the possible
effects of these and other legal revisions on Switzerland's competitive-
ness. In addition to the 1982 Swiss "Agreement XVI"' 2 and the 1981
Swiss law on international assistance in criminal matters" (both of
which Christensen briefly mentions)"4 , the Swiss Government has taken
a number of steps that have improved cooperation with United States
law enforcement agencies. For example, in recent years Swiss authori-
ties have been granting approximately 800 foreign requests per year for
banking information. Moreover, the Swiss courts have supported the
cooperative effort by permitting the release of such information in a
number of highly publicized cases.38 Switzerland has also shown what
United States Attorney General Edwin Meese termed "outstanding co-
operation in extraditing fugitives" to the United States.37 In a signifi-
cant United States drug money laundering case, the Swiss not only ex-
tradited the leading money launderer, but substantially assisted the
United States authorities in the subsequent prosecution through, among
other measures, the provision of Swiss bank records.3 Finally, the
Swiss Parliament has begun consideration of a bill to make insider
30 Shirreff, Grilezi Frankfurt., EUROMONEY, July 1986, at 36.
31 B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 27.
" Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association with Regard to the Han-
dling of Requests for Information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States on the Subject of Misuse of Inside Information, Jan. 1, 1983, reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983). Christensen refers to this Agreement as "Convention XVI." B.
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 7.
" Bundesgesetz ilber internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen [Federal Law on
International Assistance in Criminal Matters], 1981 SR 351.1, 1981 RS 351.1, art. 1.
See Friedli, New Law Helps Lift Veil of Secrecy from Swiss Banking, Legal Times,
Dec. 5, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
3, B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5, at 7.
" Putka, Those Famed Swiss Bank Accounts Aren't Quite as Impenetrable as
They Used to Be, Wall St. J., June 20, 1986, at 21, col. 4.
8 See, e.g., Supreme Court Opinion in the Second Santa Fe Case Concerning
Judicial Assistance, May 16, 1984, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 745 (1985).
" Address of Edwin Meese, III, Attorney General of the United States, before the
Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, the Swiss Bar Association, and the Swiss
Bankers Association, Zurich, Switzerland 9 (Dec. 5, 1985) (available from the United
States Department of Justice).
38 United States Department of the Treasury, Money Laundering and the Bank
Secrecy Act: The Question of Foreign Branches of Domestic Financial Institutions 24
(July 29, 1987).
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trading a criminal offense,39 and is expected to consider legislation to
make money laundering criminal as well.4
These developments have been, and will undoubtedly continue to
be, highly useful for United States law enforcement authorities in nu-
merous financial investigations. Nonetheless, some observers of the in-
ternational banking system have concluded that these continuing
changes in Swiss bank secrecy have prompted investors to place their
funds in countries less inclined to allow exceptions to bank secrecy,! 1
and have encouraged Swiss banks to expand their services outside Swit-
zerland to attract foreign capital that might otherwise flow to non-
Swiss institutions." ' Christensen's omission of any discussion of these
matters in analyzing Switzerland's position vis-a-vis other financial
centers is puzzling at best.
These shortcomings appreciably weaken Christensen's study. They
are not, however, fatal. Those familiar with international finance will
readily recognize that Christensen has produced a well researched and
often insightful overview of Switzerland's strengths and limitations as
an international financial center. Fledgling students of international
banking and finance, however, should be warned that Christensen's pa-
per is merely a point of departure for further research and analysis,
and is by no means the definitive work on the subject.
"' Studer, Insider Trading Bill Clears Swiss Lower Chamber, Wall St. J., Oct. 8,
1987, at 44, col. 4; see Rapp, Recent Developments in United States Insider Trading
Prohibition and Swiss Secrecy Laws: Towards a Definitive Reconciliation?, 5 INT'L
TAX & Bus. LAw. 1 (1987). Pending the enactment of that legislation, Swiss and
United States officials recently exchanged diplomatic notes on sharing of information in
insider trading cases. Insider Pact Reached, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1987, at F1, col. 1.
40 Parry, Swiss Plan Law to Curb Laundering, Am. Banker, Mar. 2, 1987, at 2,
col. 1. The origin of this concept is a report on money laundering in Swiss law that a
former Swiss federal prosecutor, Paolo Bernasconi, prepared at the behest of the Swiss
Ministry of Justice. P. Bernasconi, Le Blanchissage d'Argent en Droit Penal Suisse
(1986).
41 See Parry, supra note 27, at 2, col. 4.
42 Finn, Luxembourg: Color it green, FORBES, Apr. 20, 1987, at 42, 44.
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